We assess State monitoring in five domains: (1) financial, (2) encounter data, (3) quality assurance and quality improve ment, (4) access and provider networks, and (5) grievance systems.
We define adequacy to mean that the monitoring agency sets performance stan dards, checks that the monitored entity meets the standards, provides regular feedback, and develops data and studies to review outcomes. Adequate monitoring also implies timely implementation of mon itoring, allocation of sufficient resources to monitoring, consistently applied processes and standards, and improvements over time. Managed care offers a greater poten tial for improving quality and access to care than does FFS care because managed care monitoring goes beyond any that occurs under FFS.
We review the structure of Federal and State monitoring and analyze how States monitored finances, encounter data, quali ty assurance and quality improvement, access and provider networks, and griev ance procedures between 1994 and 1998. Next, we discuss Federal monitoring efforts, and finish by discussing lessons learned from the State and Federal moni toring efforts.
DATA
Findings are based on data describing the structures and processes the States and HCFA use in monitoring, collected from documents and interviews with key people in each State and the Federal Government. We interviewed State officials, staff of managed care plans, providers, legislators, and advocacy organizations during site visits in 1995, 1996, and 1998 , as part of case studies conducted for a HCFA-funded evaluation. We also drew on ongoing discussions with HCFA staff. 1
BACKGROUND
The four demonstrations covered 1.7 million Medicaid enrollees as of July 1999. Key features of these demonstrations such as start date, eligibility groups included, types of participating plans and enrollment are shown in Table 1 .
STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL AND STATE MONITORING
When it approves a section 1115 demon stration, HCFA documents which Medicaid statutes are waived and issues "Special Terms and Conditions" (henceforth called "terms") that set the standards it expects the States to meet to secure Federal financial participation. The terms cover a broad range of areas but are not uniform across the States. Terms differed for various reasons, often because States requested different waivers or were imple menting different types of programs. 1 The same interview protocols, focusing on each of the moni toring areas, were used across States, and the same types of respondents were interviewed in each State. We also drew on monitoring reports prepared by the States and their contractors.
States are authorized to monitor managed care plans through State laws and contracts with the plans, which must conform with Federal law and regulations and demonstration terms (Rosenbaum et al., 1997) . Several different departments share responsibility for plan oversight including those responsible for Medicaid, public health, and insurance (Horvath and Snow, 1996) . Some departments monitor contractually-specified performance stan dards and some regulatory standards spec ified under law. Figure 1 summarizes how Federal and State laws and regulations, contracts with managed care plans, and self-regulation interact to promote access, quality, and financial stability.
As expected when implementing such a large new venture, it took the States time to develop mature oversight structures. Moreover, initial contract performance standards, reporting requirements, and sanctions varied widely in specificity and consistency with Federal terms. All four States modified their initial plan contracts to improve plan performance standards and to comply with Federal requirements.
STATE MONITORING PROCESSES
The agencies operating the demonstra tions play a key role in monitoring in all five domains we reviewed. 2 Other State agencies also have overlapping responsibil ities for monitoring. For example, State insurance agencies monitor health plan finances for regulatory reasons unrelated to the demonstrations. States also use their external quality review organizations (EQROs) to monitor plans, as HCFA requires. 3 Our review indicates which agencies are responsible for monitoring each domain.
Demonstration Enrollment as of July 1999
Medicaid-eligibles (except QMBs and SLMBs); MCOs cover medical, acute behavioral, and dental care. Under a 1915(b) waiver, Oklahoma implemented HMOs in urban areas in July 1995. 3 In the first 3 years of TennCare, MCOs could be health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations.
NOTES: FPL is Federal poverty level. MCO is managed care organization. AFDC is Aid to Families with Dependent Children. PCCM is primary care case management. QMB is qualified Medicare beneficiary. SLMB is specified low income Medicare beneficiary. SOURCES: (Wooldridge et al., 1996; Ku and Wall, 1997; Ku and Hoag, 1998; State of Hawaii 1997; Ku et al., 2000.) 118 SOURCE: (Wooldridge, J. and Hoag, S., 1999.) States use various approaches to moni tor plan performance, including regular reviews of documents and data, onsite reviews of processes, and audits or special studies. They provide written feedback to plans and may require corrective action plans.
Monitoring Finances
States set standards intended to ensure that plans have the financial strength to accept the risk inherent to capitation, and that they have provisions for continuity in case of insolvency. Financial monitoring is intended to ensure plan stability and ade quate financial reserves through reviews of plans' compliance with the standards.
All the States set financial standards for plans in the licensure regulations. These States also enhance the regulatory stan dards by including terms in their plan contracts:
• Rhode Island includes financial perfor mance standards.
• Hawaii, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island require performance bonds.
• Tennessee requires plans to submit quarterly and annual TennCare-only income statements. Table 2 summarizes who monitors plan finances and their monitoring methods.
The States have taken actions ranging from establishing informal requirements to mandating the correction of deficient plan financial performance. Sometimes, the demonstration agencies have required the plans to increase deposits to address solvency or other financial concerns. However, these States have not used the ultimate sanction of withdrawing licensure. 3 States must contract with an entity that is external to and inde pendent of the State and the plans it contracts with to perform an annual review of the quality of services furnished by plans (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 1999).
Hawaii's procedures are the least formal of the four States. For example, as shown in Table 2 , Hawaii does not conduct onsite plan reviews, does not audit plans, and does not provide plans with feedback. When demonstration agency staff are con cerned about a plan's financial footing, the plan is required to submit financial reports monthly, rather than quarterly. (Two of the plans have been reporting monthly since QUEST began.) Oklahoma can, and has, required formal corrective actions (in 1997, one plan had to correct deficiencies through a formal corrective action plan). Rhode Island required all four plans to negotiate written corrective action plans after its 1996 reviews showed that none of its plans met all the financial benchmarks, and that two did not meet other financial management requirements. It reviewed the plans 6 months later to assess compli ance. Tennessee has the most formal financial monitoring process among the four States. It is the only one that audits plans, and it has taken the most formal actions to correct financial performance problems. Due to problems of program underfunding, some plans in Tennessee have had severe financial problems, and one was taken over temporarily by the State. However, the issue of underfunding is distinct from the adequacy of financial monitoring processes, which is the subject of this section.
Although none of these States has had a plan close as a result of financial problems, some of the diverse approaches to moni toring are inadequate, and most States lie near the least rigorous end of a continuum of financial oversight methods. Hawaii's process, which relies only on offsite review, seems inadequate to ensure that plans can fulfill their financial obligations and, therefore, may not ensure financial stability. Oklahoma works co-operatively SOURCE: (Wooldridge, J., and Hoag, S., 1999.) with the plans and provides timely informal feedback, while holding them to State stan dards. Rhode Island has chosen to prop up its weakest and least compliant plan with additional State funds and support, rather than lose it. Tennessee, a strong enforcer, has continually strengthened the structure and process of its financial monitoring. Tennessee also appears willing to lose a plan that cannot meet its performance stan dards. It took the States time to develop and fully implement these processes, and the adequacy of their financial monitoring has improved over time.
Monitoring Encounter Data
Under managed care, States have to change their data role from processing claims data to acquiring, validating, and using encounter data for monitoring. HCFA's terms required that the States (Wooldridge, J., and Hoag, S., 1999.) develop plans to implement and monitor encounter data collection and collect encounter data for use in monitoring and demonstration evaluations. The States included the same requirements in the plan contracts: plans had to collect and sub mit encounter data regularly. In some States, plans that did not do so were sub ject to financial penalties (such as payment withholds). Table 3 summarizes some of the steps the States took to monitor encounter data.
States focused initially on resolving problems the plans had in submitting encounter data. In the worst cases, States placed staff at the plans to help overcome problems or had the EQRO work closely with the plan. Only later did States imple ment regular encounter data review with feedback and corrective action plans. Moreover, the States scaled back and delayed ambitious initial plans for validat ing encounter data.
The approaches and timing of State actions to improve the quality of encounter data varied widely. Some delays were due to insufficient resources being applied to this activity, some to lack of knowledge about how to establish functioning encounter data systems (such as how to set up the system or what elements needed to be included). Tennessee began providing feedback to the plans early in the demon stration and applied sanctions when plans failed to meet contractual standards. It also sent technical assistance staff to help some plans overcome serious difficulties with provider payment related to encounter data processing problems.
Rhode Island deferred review and feedback until plans began submitting data regularly.
The adequacy of State encounter data collection and monitoring can be measured by whether a State:
• Implemented its monitoring plans and collects and reviews data regularly.
• Validates its data.
• Uses the data to conduct outcome stud ies.
• Provides the data in a format that can be used in HCFA's evaluation. Only Tennessee meets all four of these adequacy measures. It was the first State to develop a full data review process and is the only one that uses encounter data in its quality monitoring program and that pub lishes reports using the data. In an inde pendent face validation of Tennessee's encounter data for 1995 and 1996, we determined that the 1996 data appear to be usable for some measures (in particular, for inpatient measures) and for some plans. By the end of 1998, Rhode Island had fulfilled the first two of the four steps and declared that its encounter data were reasonably accurate. Oklahoma regularly reviewed plan data, but had not determined that they had reached a sufficiently high standard for use in monitoring quality. Hawaii had only recently begun to review its encounter data regularly.
It is of considerable concern for moni toring quality and for evaluations of Medicaid managed care that, 5 years into their demonstrations (3 years, in the case of Oklahoma), Tennessee is the only State that had produced usable data early enough for us to assess their adequacy and analyze them.
Monitoring Quality of Care
The primary goal of quality-of-care mon itoring is ensuring that beneficiaries receive appropriate care and that quality of care is improving, given that plans' finan cial incentives may undercut quality and access. The Federal terms required each State to conduct external audits to monitor the plans' performance. All have contract ed with an EQRO to conduct special stud ies; some have used the EQRO for addi tional activities (which are described in this and later sections). HCFA's terms require the States to develop internal and external audits and outcome studies to monitor plans' quality assurance and quali ty improvement activities (Health Care Financing Administration, 1993) . The terms also require States to include in their plan contracts requirements for internal quality assurance programs, as established by Federal law (42 CFR 434).
All four States require participating plans to operate quality assurance programs and specify what these programs should include (primarily, written descrip tions of the program's goals, scope, stan dards, and activities to be conducted). The States also incorporated in their plan contracts standards for the plans' quality assurance programs. Every State mandat ed that plans report some type of outcome, although the specific elements varied. Finally, Rhode Island also imposes an external quality standard, under which all State-licensed HMOs must be certified by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) or must have applied for NCQA certification within 2 years of startup. Table 4 summarizes State moni toring processes and their timing.
States initially provided technical assis tance to plans to establish adequate quality assurance programs. They then began to take the following steps: review whether quality assurance programs were being implemented; provide feedback and quality improvement recommendations; and require corrective action plans.
The States introduced clinical appropri ateness monitoring after they had begun monitoring the plans' quality assurance programs. Over time, States have become more sophisticated about this type of mon itoring. They now require the plans to conduct studies focused on various clinical areas and targeted populations, and to SOURCE: (Wooldridge, J., and Hoag, S., 1999.) develop clinically appropriate practice guidelines. Moreover, the States themselves began conducting their own special studies. All four States require plans to submit corrective action plans when their quality assurance programs are out of compliance with State standards. Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Tennessee documented the comprehensiveness of both their quality assurance program reviews and their feedback to the plans. The feedback was thor ough, focused, and had as its goal future quality improvement.
The States have conducted studies to assess outcomes for given populations across plans. Each State recognized that focused studies based on medical record reviews, encounter data, and other data sources are important for assessing clini cally appropriate care provision, as these studies can identify important delivery or quality problems (for example, underser vice or inappropriate service). (If medical record reviews uncovered problems, the penalties could be quite severe. For exam ple, Tennessee's contracts provide for sus pension if medical records indicate quality problems [State of Tennessee, 1995] .) For example, Hawaii's study of Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment services uncovered a need to improve lead risk/lead levels, dental screens/fluoride assessments, developmental/behavioral assessments, tubercu losis skin tests, and vision assessment (FMH, Inc., 1997). Oklahoma's EQRO studied birth outcomes and found that plans improved rates of prenatal care in the first trimester between 1995 and 1996, but that females still were not receiving the number of visits recommended by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (State of Oklahoma, 1997). Oklahoma's study counted only visits paid for by a SoonerCare plan; thus, the smallerthan-recommended number of visits may be a result of females receiving visits prior to their SoonerCare eligibility, as those vis its were not counted in the study.
By late 1997, the States were actively monitoring quality assurance programs, requiring plans to conduct focused studies, conducting their own focused studies, pro viding feedback, and requiring actions to correct identified deficiencies. However, they were slow to initiate these activities. Delays were due to a focus on startup activ ities, lack of resources, staff turnover, and problems with encounter data. Initially, some contracts did not require plans to conduct their own studies. Rhode Island delayed onsite quality assurance program review until 1996. Hawaii and Rhode Island waited until 2 years into their demonstrations to select EQRO contrac tors to conduct focused studies, even though it was a Federal requirement to have an external auditor.
Although Tennessee selected its EQRO in the first year, the EQRO initially provided technical assistance to help the plans develop ade quate quality assurance programs. As a result of these delays, State-sponsored monitoring studies did not take place until at least 2, and sometimes 3, years into the demonstrations (except in Oklahoma). Moreover, only Tennessee has published monitoring studies based on encounter data. Because we believe that States should be publicly accountable for the quality of care delivered under the demon strations, we consider that States should publish these studies, rather than use them only internally.
Monitoring Access and Provider Networks
One concern that HCFA and the States have about implementing Medicaid managed care programs is how access to providers (and choice of providers) will be affected. Thus, States establish and moni tor access performance and provider network standards. Here, we review State monitoring standards for access (such as appointment waiting times and travel times) and primary care networks.
The Federal terms for Oklahoma and Tennessee require them to comply with standards for appointment waiting times and travel times set by HCFA. In addition, all the States require the plans to meet State-specified access standards for appointment waiting times and travel times. The plans, in turn, are to incorpo rate these and other access standards into their quality assurance programs and to monitor themselves against these stan dards.
Because of the importance of the provider network to adequate access, the Federal terms set provider network stan dards. The States, in turn, included provider network standards in their plan contracts. Rhode Island and Oklahoma incorporated the strictest standards, which specified provider-to-population ratios for both primary care and other practitioners. Rhode Island also specified mandatory mainstreaming. 4 Oklahoma specified that providers could not intentionally segregate Medicaid patients from other patients they serve. Network adequacy standards in Tennessee and Hawaii were less specific. Table 5 summarizes the methods that the States used to monitor access and primary care provider networks.
States were actively monitoring access by the second demonstration year. Hawaii set Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) access perfor mance standards for its plans and undertook its first onsite performance review in spring 1995. 5 By that fall (1 year after startup), it prepared a report on plan perfor mance based on plan reports to the State. 2 In addition, in both urban and rural programs, up to 875 members for each nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or medical resident affiliated with the PCP is allowed; if the physician assistant or nurse practitioner has a separate PCP contract, these standards do not apply.
NOTES: PCCM is primary care case management. PCP is primary care provider.
SOURCE: (Wooldridge, J., and Hoag, S.,1999.) These reports showed that the plans were monitoring their performance against both State and plan access standards, and that they had made changes to improve access to care and access to member services. Hawaii set a same-day requirement for see ing patients with emergency and urgent care needs and a 3-week requirement for non-urgent care. Plans reported setting and meeting the State emergency stan dards. Some plans reported a lower per formance standard for urgent care-up to 48 hours, instead of within 24 hours, but reported that the majority of patients were seen within 24 hours. One plan set a 6-week standard for seeing non-urgent cases, compared with the State's 3-week standard, and reported that 25 percent of its patients were seen more than 1 month after they had tried to make an appoint ment. HCFA reported that communication between Hawaii and the plans appeared to be good, but that the State was not spend ing enough time reviewing plan compli ance with the contract (Health Care Financing Administration, 1997). Hawaii is the only one of these four States that has not required a plan to take corrective action on its provider networks. Oklahoma reported in its second annual report to HCFA that it monitors access in both the capitated and partially-capitated programs (State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 1997). However, that report focused on how the State moni tors plan networks, rather than on access to the networks. Oklahoma also monitors access through analysis of member inci dent and complaint reports (PasternikIkard, 1999 ). Oklahoma's 1997 survey found that 65 percent of those surveyed in urban areas believed appointment wait times were too long, an increase from 23 percent during the previous year (State of Oklahoma, 1997). Because it was disturbed by these survey results, the State planned to monitor plans' compliance against contract-specified timeframes in 1998. Within 14 months of startup, Rhode Island had embarked on a study of access and network composition (Birch and Davis Health Management Corporation, 1996a) . It identified such deficiencies as non-com pliance of plan performance standards with State standards. As a result, it modified the plan contracts in 1996 and drew up a detailed plan for monitoring plan perfor mance in all areas, including access (Birch and Davis Health Management Corporation, 1996b) . In both 1996 and 1997, it again reviewed deficient plans and negotiated corrective action plans (cover ing a variety of areas, not just access) with all of them.
Rhode Island is the only State among these four to have two agencies monitoring access and provider networks. Rhode Island's regulatory agency, the Division of Health Services Regulation, cited a plan for access violations in 1996. The agency also received numerous complaints about access problems in another plan, including problems with the plan's physician capaci ty and provision of mental health care; lack of documentation about complaints, denials, and appeals; and inadequate infra structure. The agency's investigation cul minated in a consent decree with the plan, although representatives from the State regulatory agency indicated that the plan took 18 months to comply with identified deficiencies. The Division of Health Regulation believes that this delay compro mised its standing with other plans in the State; its apparent failure to hold this plan to the State's standards may prevent the other plans from taking the Division seri ously. This issue caused friction between the Division of Health Services Regulation and the RIte Care demonstration agency.
Tennessee appears to use the plans' rou tine reports as its only source for routine reviewing of wait time measures and does no independent verification. (Although TennCare uses its annual member satisfac tion survey to review the adequacy of wait times to appointments and wait times in the office, the resulting data are at the program level, not the plan level.) Finally, Tennessee has applied financial sanctions to plans that have not conformed to its pri mary care provider network standards.
The States' standards for monitoring access and provider networks vary greatly, as do their monitoring methods. In some States, access monitoring does not include assessments of whether plans meet the patient travel and wait time standards (to appointments and in the office); for exam ple, Oklahoma relies on its satisfaction sur vey results, rather than assessing the plans on these standards. Thus, although the Federal Government set standards for wait times and travel standards, it is unclear whether the demonstrations are in compli ance.
Provider network standards are relative ly weak in most of the States and thus, do not rule out access problems even when plans meet the standards. We share the concerns of the U.S. General Accounting Office about the States' approaches to monitoring network provider-to-population ratios (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997). Providers usually see many out-ofplan patients, but Oklahoma is the only State to take this factor into account by including those patients in the provider-topopulation ratio.
Thus, except in Oklahoma, States' measured provider availability overstates actual availability.
Furthermore, only in Hawaii and Rhode Island do the provider-to-population ratios take into account whether providers accept new patients. Oklahoma and Tennessee do not monitor the proportion of network providers that accept new patients. Tennessee recognized this problem and undertook two network studies to monitor providers' acceptance of new patients. However, it does not conduct this monitor ing on an ongoing basis, as Hawaii and Rhode Island do.
Although numeric network standards are designed to protect access adequacy, they do not take into account quality changes that can result from providers leaving the network. There is considerable potential for care disruption when providers leave a plan. Some States have limited the ability of plans to drop providers to protect continuity of care. 6
Monitoring Grievances
Managed care plans operate under financial incentives that might cause them to limit, deny, or delay members' care. Therefore, the States require that the plans establish formal procedures members can use to complain, grieve, or appeal a deci sion about care or coverage (Raymond, 1995) . The intent of these procedures, col lectively referred to as the "grievance sys tem," is to protect members against harm and to hold the plans accountable for their actions. Each of the four States has a dif ferent formal definition of the elements of the grievance process. A "complaint" usu ally refers to the lowest level of member dissatisfaction, often expressed through a telephone call to the plan (by either a mem ber or his or her provider). A "grievance" is a formal written complaint that once sent, requires review within a certain peri od, with provisions for expedited reviews if the member's physician believes a decision is urgently needed (again, filed by a mem ber or his or her provider). An "appeal" is a member's last chance to have another (Wooldridge, J., and Hoag, S., 1999.) hearing of the issue by the State, if the grievance has not been decided in the member's favor. Although not formally a part of the grievance process, part of the managed care plans' education efforts must include informing members about their rights to file grievances. HCFA requires the States to ensure that the plans institute functioning and timely grievance systems, and to send HCFA the plan grievance reports. (Hawaii is the exception, because State reporting was not specified in the initial terms.) The process standard was explicitly specified only in Oklahoma's terms. The States set compa rable standards for plans. Grievance stan dards typically limit the time plans have to review and resolve a complaint or griev ance; they also specify procedures for res olution. All States require plans to report grievances periodically that they, in turn, report to HCFA.
Tennessee's grievance procedures underwent a major change in 1996, when a Federal district court ruled that the TennCare grievance and appeals process was inadequate. The Federal ruling required the State to adopt a new grievance procedure that gave members greater access and stronger rights, and that strengthened monitoring. As a result, Tennessee is the only State that includes sanctions for non-compliance in its plan contracts, and the only State in which the demonstration agency does not monitor plans on grievances. It requires plans that do not respond to grievances within the specified time to cover the denied service. Table 6 summarizes grievance-monitoring responsibilities and methods, by State.
Two States have never found their plans' grievance procedures to be deficient and two have taken action in response to defi ciencies. Hawaii has neither taken action against a plan based on its reviews of plan grievance reports nor provided feedback to the plans in this area. Oklahoma has never requested that a plan take corrective actions because of grievances (MacCauley, 1998) . In contrast, Rhode Island, in its 1996 plan reviews, found all four plans to be deficient in some aspect of the griev ance procedures. Deficiencies identified ranged from serious (one plan not imple menting the grievance procedures as spec ified in the State contract) to minor (one plan requiring some minor wording changes in its grievance policies to reflect the State's exact 1996 contract language). Rhode Island required the plans to correct these deficiencies. Tennessee uses its annual EQRO reviews to give plans feedback on their grievance systems. The State "automatically" takes action against non-compliant plans by requiring them to cover any denied service if they fail to respond to the grievance within the prescribed time.
States did not monitor grievance systems initially, not only because available resources were being devoted to operations when the demonstrations began, but also because they did not recognize the importance of effective grievance systems in offering pro tection to a vulnerable population that lacked experience with managed care. Over time, they have made it easier for enrollees to complain. Furthermore, most States make the final decision about the validity of a com plaint. Except in Hawaii, States are now actively monitoring grievance structures and processes, and giving the plans feedback. Thus, Hawaii's grievance monitoring process is inadequate. HCFA found that some QUEST plans were not reporting com plaints or grievances that had been resolved to the member's satisfaction (Health Care Financing Administration, 1997). It also found that the State had not investigated or verified one plan's report of no complaints. HCFA reported that Hawaii does not know whether plans have informed their members about their rights to submit grievances. Rhode Island and Tennessee have estab lished systems that give beneficiaries greater access to the grievance system than HCFA requires. 7 Oklahoma meets the min imum HCFA standard.
Onsite reviews of the plans' grievance sys tems are necessary to ensure that all the required elements of the grievance system are in place, as is feedback about those processes. Tennessee and Oklahoma have conducted these reviews from the beginning of their demonstrations, while Rhode Island conduct ed its first onsite reviews of plans' implementa tion of grievance procedures in 1996. 7 In the case of Tennessee, the legal action was prompted by the legal aid society which has had an important role in shaping the TennCare program.
FEDERAL MONITORING OF STATES
HCFA must monitor the demonstrations to verify that the States comply with the terms, and that quality of care and access to care do not diminish under managed care. Although HCFA had considerable experience (primarily at the regional offices) monitoring section 1915(b) Medicaid managed care programs, the scale and number of the new section 1115 demonstrations was unprecedented, and HCFA accordingly had to make changes in its approaches to monitoring. The respon sibility for monitoring section 1915(b) demonstrations lay primarily with the regional office staff, following a central office protocol. The monitoring elements included document review, site visits, and ongoing communication with State staff, but there was wide variation in regional office monitoring practices. Major changes for the section 1115 demonstrations were the development of joint central and regional office monitoring teams headed by project officers in the central office and a systematizing of monitoring approaches.
The project officer, who is based in HCFA's central office in Baltimore, leads this team and is a State's chief point of contact at HCFA. However, the appropriate HCFA regional office usually has the pri mary obligation for overseeing a State's compliance with the terms and conditions, although there is considerable variation across States in how the roles are distrib uted across central and regional offices. HCFA monitoring begins with an onsite readiness review before implementation. After implementation, HCFA conducts onsite reviews, offsite document reviews, and conference calls with State staff.
HCFA can modify a State's demonstra tion terms, as it has done in two of the four States reviewed here. There is little other formal feedback to the States, unless unusual situations or problems arise. HCFA had the opportunity to annually modify the terms of these demonstrations, or could do this at the waiver renewal time (after the demonstrations were running for 5 years). According to HCFA representa tives, HCFA is contemplating dropping the annual renewal process during which the terms could be modified in favor of a more collaborative approach. Furthermore, once demonstrations approved prior to August 1997 are extended beyond the ini tial 5 years, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 prohibits HCFA from modifying the terms (Federal Register, 1998) .
Rather than formal feedback, HCFA pro vides feedback through more informal channels, such as teleconferences and per sonal telephone calls. The emphasis on informal communications allows HCFA to convey any concerns to the States quickly. However, some monitoring team members suggested that HCFA could improve its feedback to States by documenting find ings more often and sharing them with the States.
HCFA's monitoring processes and oversight procedures have matured, but resource and political constraints and staff turnover have hampered the monitoring process. Early Federal monitoring was focused on operational problems, but as the demonstrations have matured, HCFA has focused on monitoring compliance with the terms and has been particularly attentive to monitoring quality issues. Still, some areas of the Federal monitoring process need improvement. For example, despite substantial informal feedback, there is a dearth of formal feedback on findings; when there is formal feedback, it is often late, making it difficult for the States to take HCFA seriously.
DISCUSSION
These four States implemented their demonstrations at a period when Medicaid managed care and Medicaid managed care monitoring processes were in their infancy. It took them time to implement the basic demonstrations (especially getting enroll ment working smoothly) and, initially, these implementation issues took the time and attention that might have been devoted to monitoring in a more mature Medicaid managed care world. Thus, monitoring in these demonstrations was slow to start and all these demonstrations were operating for months or years before thorough mon itoring of managed care plans became rou tine. Over time, States were able to devel op, implement, and strengthen monitoring structures, thus coming mostly into com pliance with their Federal terms and condi tions for operating the demonstrations. Most of the limitations in monitoring we found were procedural rather than struc tural. In some States, monitoring has been hampered by a lack of resources. Federal monitoring has similarly suffered from a lack of resources, as well as political pres sure. After 4 years of operations, we con cluded that monitoring was not adequate to ensure access and quality even though monitoring it is critically important for pro tecting vulnerable Medicaid populations from harm.
Full-Scale Monitoring After a Learning Period
Monitoring was slow to begin. The States had little experience in monitoring managed care, and although HCFA had monitored numerous section 1915(b) demonstrations, it had not refined its approach to address the monitoring needs of the comprehensive section 1115 demon strations. The States initially focused on overcoming their own and the managed care plans' operational problems, which limited the resources available for monitor ing and delayed its implementation. Some managed care plans, especially new ones, had no experience monitoring quality assurance and quality improvement. States sometimes provided technical assis tance to overcome plan problems and delayed implementing regular monitoring review and feedback until plans had made progress. Finally, the lack at startup of Medicaid-specific tools, such as a Medicaid HEDIS or a Consumer Assessments of Health Plans Survey Medicaid satisfaction survey, slowed implementation of some aspects of monitoring.
More Resources to Monitor Managed Care
Adequate financial resources and welltrained staff are necessary to support mon itoring. However, building a staff with appropriate skills and knowledge of managed care has been a challenge for the States. Some reported that they had to work with and re-train staff from their tra ditional Medicaid programs, who usually lacked monitoring experience.
States devoted inadequate resources to monitor some of the five domains we reviewed. For example, Hawaii lagged in devoting sufficient resources to monitoring plan finances and plan quality assurance processes. A report by HCFA (1997) criti cized the State for insufficient quality improvement resources, a situation that worsened in 1998. Except in Tennessee, which has collected and used encounter data for outcome studies, the resources allocated to collecting and reviewing encounter data were sparse until late in the 5-year demon stration period. 
States are Using Performance Standards
Performance standards play different roles in quality improvement approaches to monitoring than in quality assurance approaches. In the former, the standards are goals toward which the plans must move (and which may be changed after the standards have been met); in the latter, attention focuses on meeting the standards. Every State's contracts specified perfor mance standards for all five domains reviewed, although the standards varied across States. All four States adopted a similar approach to setting performance standards, choosing to combine some external standards (such as HEDIS or Quality Assurance Reform Initiative) with some newly developed ones.
State Monitoring-Improvements Must be Maintained
Over time, the States have implemented and improved monitoring of managed care plans. States have introduced stronger requirements in their plan contracts, hired staff to monitor the plans, and implement ed more thorough reviews of plan perfor mance. However, some States are more advanced than others. Furthermore, the States face the ongoing challenge of encouraging the plans to continue to provide quality services, in part by ensuring that plans do not backtrack after meeting a given standard. Staff turnover, both at the plan and the State levels, also caused some periodic discontinuity in monitoring, although as State and plan monitoring pro cedures improved and became more insti tutionalized over time, they were easier to transfer to new staff.
Feedback and Corrective Actions Var y
Monitoring is pointless unless it includes feedback and requires improve ments in deficient performance. The extent of feedback and corrective action varied. All four States give plans feedback on encounter data, and quality assurance programs. All the States except Hawaii give feedback and require corrective action in the domains of finances, griev ances, and access and provider networks. Thus, Hawaii seems to be lacking in an important dimension of monitoring.
States Have Different Plan Monitoring Styles
Some States adopted a partnership approach to monitoring, based on a quality improvement philosophy in which plans were not always held to performance stan dards, sanctions were rare, but improve ment was required and monitored. However, not holding the plans to stan dards causes equity problems. In contrast, some States adopted a regulator y approach to monitoring, based on a quality assurance philosophy in which sanctions were applied when plans did not meet the standards. A drawback to this approach is that some performance standards may be unreasonable, even if they are useful as goals. Thus, applying sanctions may be more punitive than quality-enhancing.
In reality, the States apply a mix of both the regulatory and partnership approaches to monitoring although some States are closer to one model than the other. Rhode Island embraces the partnership model in which continuous feedback, assistance, and negotiation of issues are the chief mon itoring methods and sanctions are rare. Tennessee comes closest to the regulatory model, in which enforcement is the norm, and penalties are imposed when plans do not meet performance standards. Tennessee does provide assistance and feedback to the plans but negotiates with them less often than does Rhode Island. Oklahoma incorporates elements of both approaches: it negotiates with its plans but also enforces performance standards. Hawaii rarely enforces contract terms and rarely provides feedback and assistance to the plans.
Under the partnership approach, fre quent communication limits problems and improves relationships with the plans. Rhode Island, in particular, has a commit ment, which includes resources, to use monitoring to improve plan performance. However, this approach can have drawbacks, because States may have to commit substantial resources to supporting weaker plans, and interplan equity may be undermined. For example, Rhode Island has jeopardized its credibility with some plans by working closely with just one plan, Neighborhood Health Plan. Rhode Island gave the plan financial assistance and a risk-sharing deal that no other plan has received; nevertheless, the State's actions clearly communicate that it does not intend that any participating plans should fail.
Benefits of the regulatory approach to monitoring are that plans have strong incentives to comply with State standards, and the States have some assurances that plans will not fail or perform poorly if they follow the rules. Penalties-usually finan cial ones-are imposed if the standards are not met. Moreover, in a State with many plans (like Tennessee, which originally had more than twice as many plans as did the other States), a regulatory approach may have been the better choice; the part nership approach may be more feasible when there are fewer plans. The disadvan tages of the regulatory approach result from the more distant relationship between the State and plans. There is less communication between the plans and the State and the plans may lack incentives to exceed the minimum standards. Moreover, regulation and sanctions do not always produce improvements. As the number of plans in Tennessee dropped from 12 to 9 between 1994 and 1997, the State adopted more elements of the part nership approach.
HCFA's Monitoring
HCFA faces two contradictory forces in monitoring section 1115 demonstrations. Like all Federal agencies, it must be pub licly accountable to taxpayers, yet it is under pressure to be more flexible in its relationships with the States. We find that this situation makes it very difficult for the agency to fulfill its duties. HCFA has legal responsibilities to monitor the demonstra tions, and a partnership approach was envi sioned. The reality is that HCFA is under political and resource pressures to take a laissez-faire approach, in which the States operate the demonstrations as they see fit, rather than take a true partnership approach. HCFA inter venes when it believes that a major problem is occurring, but a partnership implies a two-way dia logue. Thus, the States must share respon sibility for ensuring successful partnering.
HCFA's oversight and monitoring of State managed care demonstrations has evolved. HCFA learned from these demon strations, and the forthcoming final Balanced Budget Act regulations on Medicaid managed care will provide more specificity for Medicaid managed care mon itoring by HCFA (Sachs, 1999) . We have seen changes in the terms over time, with greater clarification about what HCFA wants. In the future, HCFA could improve its monitoring and promote partnering with the States by providing more formal feedback to the States (either by issuing revised terms in a timely way or working collabora tively with States to solve problems of com pliance with terms), and spending more time in face-to-face meetings with the States to work through issues. However, as of late 1998, more resources are needed to moni tor and to provide constructive feedback to the States.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the four States we reviewed, monitoring by HCFA and the States is not yet at the point of ensuring access and quality. Initial State monitoring of plans was clearly inadequate; in response, HCFA and the States have improved the monitor ing structure (regulatory and contractual standards), monitoring processes, and resources devoted to monitoring in the five domains examined. Some States have stressed the enforcement of performance standards (a quality assurance approach), others have focused on quality improve ment toward standards. To some extent, all four States (and HCFA) implemented elements of both approaches. However, an approach in which frequent communica tion and feedback is wedded to assurance of standards seems most likely to ensure access and quality. Regardless of the approach taken, and while recognizing that resource and political constraints will be limiting factors, we have shown that HCFA and the States can take many steps to improve their monitoring.
These findings raise two questions about implementing Medicaid managed care monitoring:
• Should these government entities have been more diligent about establishing the right monitoring structures and processes from the inception of the demonstrations?
• How sophisticated should we expect Federal and State monitoring to be, espe cially relative to the commercial sector? HCFA and State monitoring of Medicaid managed care in the section 1115 demon strations took a while to be fully imple mented because of both avoidable and unavoidable problems. Avoidable prob lems are ones that could have been overcome with additional resources (although as a practical matter, resources were nec essarily allocated initially to implementing critical demonstration activities, such as enrolling beneficiaries). Lack of experi ence in these States led to some probably unavoidable delays in full implementation of monitoring, although we would argue that some of the delays were too long. When the demonstrations began, few tools were available for monitoring Medicaid managed care-a signal that monitoring was in its infancy. In the commercial sec tor, which provides the only standard of comparison, monitoring of managed care plans by private purchasers has been limit ed to a few large purchasers of care.
In conclusion, we recommend that as States expand their capitated Medicaid managed care programs, they build on the experiences of the States that have pio neered Medicaid managed care monitor ing, by identifying what methods are suc cessful in a given social, economic, and political climate, and what level of resources will be required. All States face the challenge of convincing legislators that they need more staff to monitor managed care than they did to run the traditional Medicaid insurance program. We hope that this article, by presenting details of dif ferent approaches and methods used in "pioneer" States, will help States to develop effective monitoring in their Medicaid managed care programs.
